Wallet addresses are convenient identifiers, but they do not necessarily correspond one-to-one with people or organisations. A reward offered once per address can therefore encourage behaviour the programme never intended. Future rules should define the eligible unit before the technical system begins counting claims.
Choose what the limit applies to
A programme might limit awards by person, organisation, verified service action or another defined unit. Those choices have different evidence and privacy implications. The system should implement the chosen rule accurately rather than assume that an address supplies the answer.
One person may legitimately use several wallets, while a provider-managed address may represent many customers. The programme needs to understand these patterns before treating address counts as participant counts. Otherwise, both abuse controls and public reporting can be distorted by a technical identifier that does not match the commercial relationship the programme is trying to recognise.
Test a repeated-claim scenario
Consider a hypothetical promotion intended to reward one completed training enrolment. If awards follow wallet connection alone, a participant might create several addresses without making several genuine enrolments. Linking the award to the verified service record would address a different part of the problem. The design should also consider repeated cancellations, referrals among related accounts and other ways the rule could be exploited. These examples are tests of programme incentives rather than allegations about actual users. They help the team choose evidence that reflects the intended contribution while avoiding controls that are expensive yet easy to bypass.
Allow a legitimate explanation
A pattern that looks unusual can have an ordinary cause, such as a customer changing wallets or an organisation managing several authorised accounts. Automated rejection should therefore have an appropriate review route. The operator should request only information relevant to the case and explain what can be corrected.
A decision should identify the applied rule and supporting record, with access controls for sensitive material. The programme also needs a way to restore an award wrongly withheld without creating a second claim that its own system treats as another violation. Fair review is part of a functioning control rather than an optional courtesy.
Report the correct population
A programme update should distinguish addresses, applicants, verified participants and completed qualifying actions. A rising wallet count does not establish the same rise in individual customers. ALFA's whitepaper already separates registered and active service users; rewards reporting should preserve a similarly careful distinction. The budget can then be assessed against useful outcomes and reviewed exceptions. Clear definitions make it easier to detect abuse, explain legitimate cases and understand whether the programme reached the intended audience, without presenting a technical activity count as broader evidence of adoption or commercial demand.
